

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
CINCEUR

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CINCPAC AND CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PK, PGOV, PINT
SUBJECT: WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?-CHAPTER TWO

REF: A) 77 ISLAMABAD 10273 B) ISLAMABAD 0335 C) ISLAMABAD 1995

SUMMARY-ALTHOUGH CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA)
GENERAL ZIA REMAINS SUPREME, HIS AUTHORITY HAS BEEN DILUTED
SINCE OUR LAST EXAMINATION OF HIS POSITION (REF A) AS
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THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION (MLA) EXPANDS ITS ACTIVITIES,
POWER BECOMES MORE DIFFUSE, AND ZIA DEPENDS MORE ON HIS
MILITARY COLLEAGUES AND THE BUREAUCRACY. ZIA IS ALSO
HAMPERED BY HIS SHRINKING BASE OF POPULAR SUPPORT.

THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT BODY-THE MILITARY COUNCIL-
REMAINS INSTITUTIONALLY IMPOTENT, AND THE ARMY CORPS
COMMANDERS ARE STILL THE MOST POWERFUL CADRE IN THE

COUNTRY. MAJOR CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE COMMANDERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, BUT ZIA CANNOT COUNT ON THEIR UNQUESTIONED ACQUIESCENCE AND SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH HE IS PRE-EMINENT AMONG HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES, WE CONTINUE TO SEE INDICATIONS OF DISCONTENT AMONG SENIOR OFFICERS.

THE MEMBERS OF THE MLA'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS HAVE ASSUMED CONSIDERABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGING THE COUNTRY, AND MANY HAVE GREATER AUTHORITY THAN DID THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN BHUTTO YEARS. SECRETARY-GENERAL-IN-CHIEF GHULAM ISHAQ IS STILL THE DE FACTO PRIME MINISTER, AND MANY OF THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF THE MLA BEAR HIS PERSONAL STAMP.

THE CAREER CIVIL SERVICE IS MORE COMFORTABLE WITH ZIA THAN IT WAS RIGHT AFTER THE TAKE-OVER, BUT IT IS STILL DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE FUTURE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE FEELS INSECURE. THE CIVIL SERVANTS ENJOY THEIR INCREASED AUTHORITY, HOWEVER, AND VIEW THE MLA AS A WELCOME DEPARTURE FROM BHUTTO'S ATTEMPTS TO WEAKEN THEIR ELITE CADRE. ZIA STILL LACKS IMMEDIATE ADVISORS WHO ARE POLITICALLY ASTUTE, AND HIS DISDAIN FOR MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S POLITICIANS HAS INCREASED.

THE MLA'S DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM HAS SLOWLY EVOLVED AND REFLECTS A GOVERNMENT LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A LONGER STAY. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOW A WORKABLE SYSTEM, IT DOES NOT HELP IN THE SEARCH FOR AN ENDURING POLITICAL REMEDY TO THE COUNTRY'S ILLS.

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AS THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTIONS WHICH INCREASINGLY BELIE ITS NAME, AND ASSUMES ADDITIONAL TRAPPINGS OF PERMANENCY, THE QUESTION OF WHO RUNS THE COUNTRY TAKES ON EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNING AND SOME OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED HAVE CHANGED SINCE OUR LAST REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT FOUR MONTHS AGO. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHO RUNS PAKISTAN IN MARCH, 1978 END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL ZIA REMAINS SUPREME, BUT...

CHIEF MARIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA) GENERAL ZIA UL-HAQ IS STILL IN CHARGE. ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS THE FINAL ARBITER, HIS AUTHORITY HAS, FOR SEVERAL REASONS, BEEN DILUTED DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS.

2. FOR HIS FIRST SEVERAL MONTHS IN POWER, ZIA DIRECTED MOST OF HIS EFFORTS AND THOSE OF THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION (MLA) TOWARD ONE GOAL-HOLDING ELECTIONS. NOW THAT THE MLA SEEMS TO BE SETTLING I FOR A LONG STAY, IT HAS BEGUN TO ACT ON A MUCH BROADER FRONT AND IS MAKING DECISIOS ON MATTERS RANGING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND

SOCIAL SPECTRUM. THIS CONSEQUENTLY HAS LED TO A GREATER DIFFUSION OF POWER. ZIA DOES NOT HAVE BHUTTO'S INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL ABILITIES AND IS VERY DEPENDENT ON HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES, HIS CIVILIAN ADVISORS, AND THE BUREAUCRACY TO HELP IN GOVERNING. ZIA ALSO REMAINS A WEAK MANAGER WITH NO PREVIOUS BACKGROUND IN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. THIS REINFORCES THE BUREAUCRACY'S TENDENCY TO ASSUME GREATER AUTHORITY.

3. ZIA IS ALSO INCREASINGLY HAMPERED BY HIS LACK OF POPULAR POLITICAL SUPPORT. WHEN HE ASSUMED POWER HE WAS WARMLY WELCOMED, BUT MORE FOR THE SURCEASE FROM STRUGGLE HE BROUGHT THAN BECAUSE OF HAPPINESS WITH MILITARY RULE. AS THE DIFFICULTIES OF LAST YEAR FADE FROM MEMORY, AND AS
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IMPATIENCE AND DISILLUSION WITH MILITARY RULE GROWS, ZIA HAS A CONTINUALLY SHRINKING POPULAR BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ZIA, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE LITERATE CLASSES, SEEMS TO BE ONE OF DISRESPECT AND IRREVERANCE. HE IS OFTEN MOCKED AS A BUMBLER AND CRITICIZED FOR AN INABILITY TO INSPIRE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE FACT HE CONTINUES TO LIVE IN THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF'S RESIDENCE, TO WEAR HIS UNIFORM, AND ATTEND TO SOME OF HIS SPECIFIC ARMY DUTIES HELPED TO SUPPORT HIS STATEMENTS THAT HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN A PERMANENT POLITICAL ROLE. THIS CONTENTION IS WEARING THIN, HOWEVER, AND IS SEEN BY AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PEOPLE AS A GUISE MASKING HIS REAL INTENTIONS.

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5. ZIA'S DISCONCERTING HABIT OF MAKING QUICK DECISIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE STUDY HAS MODERATED DURING HIS MONTHS IN POWER. HE STILL SOMETIMES SHOOTS FROM THE HIP, HOWEVER, PROMISING MORE THAN HE CAN DELIVER, OFTEN LEAVING THE BUREAUCRATS SCURRYING IN HIS WAKE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE.

6. AN ACID TEST OF ZIA'S ABILITY TO LEAD THE NATION MAY COME WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WHEN THE VERDICT IN THE BHUTTO MURDER TRIAL IN LAHORE IS ANNOUNCED. IF THE
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FORMER PRIME MINISTER IS FOUND GUILTY, AND SENTENCED TO DEATH, THE PPP COULD CALL ITS SUPPORTERS INTO THE STREETS FOR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE MLA. EVEN THOUGH SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS COULD MOST PROBABLY BE EVENTUALLY CONTAINED BY THE ARMY, THEY WOULD PUT CONSIDERABLE STRAINS ON THE COHESION OF THE SENIOR RANKS IN THE MILITARY, AND, IF LARGE-SCALE AND PROLONGED, COULD FORCE CHANGES IN THE MLA LEADERSHIP.

7. MILITARY COUNCIL-THE COUNCIL REMAINS NEARLY POWERLESS AND INACTIVE AS AN ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH THE SERVICE CHIEFS, ESPECIALLY ADMIRAL SHARIFF, HAVE INFLUENCE IN THEIR OWN RIGHT AND POWER AS THE LEADERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES. AS THE MLA BECOMES MORE INVOLVED IN THE SPECIFICS OF GOVERNING, THE COUNCIL'S FUNCTIONS ARE EVEN FURTHER REDUCED, AND THE CIVILIAN ADVISORS AND THE BUREAUCRACY PLAY A LARGER ROLE.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH ADMIRAL SHARIFF AND AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ZULFIKAR HAVE AGREED TO EXTEND THEIR TENURES "FOR THE DURATION." BOTH ARE COMPETENT MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE CLOSELY TIED TO ZIA BECAUSE OF THE EVENTS OF JULY FIFTH. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IN ZIA'S INTEREST THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TWO JUNIOR SERVICES REMAINS STABLE, AND HE WOULD PREFER NOT TO HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT SUCCESSORS FOR HIS TWO COLLEAGUES. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE GENERAL SHARIFF REMAINS ACTIVE ON THE SOCIAL CIRCUIT AND TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY, BOTH WITHIN PAKISTAN AND ABROAD, BUT HE IS SEEN AS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE IN THE MLA INNER CIRCLES.

9. CORPS COMMANDERS- THE SIX ARMY CORPS COMMANDERS ARE STILL THE MOST POWERFUL CADRE IN THE COUNTRY, BUT THEIR
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POSITION HAS CHANGED IN RECENT MONTHS. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS OF 1977 AND THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, GENERAL ZIA ENGINEERED MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CORPS COMMANDERS' LISTS. IT WAS A DIFFICULT MANEUVER, AND SEVERAL OF THE COMMANDERS REPORTEDLY RESISTED THE CHANGES. HOWEVER, ZIA PERSEVERED THEREBY SHOWING HE IS STILL PRIMUS INTER PARES.

10. LT. GENERAL ARBAB, PURPORTED PLAYBOY AND, ACCORDING TO THE SIND AND PUNJAB RUMOR MILL, THE RECIPIENT OF CONSIDERABLE ILLEGAL LARGESSE DURING HIS TENURE AS CORPS COMMANDER AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR IN KARACHI, HAS RELUCTANTLY DEPARTED FOR ANKARA AS PAKISTAN'S PERMANENT MILITARY DELEGATE TO CENTO. ARBAB STALLED HIS MOVE UNTIL ZIA WAS FORCED TO MAKE AN UNSCHEDULED LATE NIGHT TRIP TO KARACHI, CALL A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH ARBAB PRESENT, AND ANNOUNCE THE CORPS COMMANDER WAS DEPARTING IMMINENTLY FOR ANKARA.

11. LT. GENERAL IQBAL, WHO MOVED FROM THE LAHORE CORPS, TOOK ARBAB'S PLACE. LAHORE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN CONSIDERED THE SENIOR CORPS, AND IQBAL, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY HESITANT TO MOVE TO KARACHI, EVENTUALLY BOWED TO ZIA'S WISH. LT. SARWAR KHAN, FORMERLY IN PESHAWAR, WAS MOVED TO LAHORE AS CORPS COMMANDER. SARWAR HAS BEEN CONSIDERED APOLITICAL, LOYAL TO ZIA AND A QUIET, NON-FLAMBOYANT MILITARY OFFICER. ZIA UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDERS HIM MORE MALLEABLE AND LESS INDEPENDENT AND FEISTY THAN IQBAL. BOTH SARWAR AND IQBAL HAVE MOVED INTO THEIR NEW JOBS WITH AUTHORITY.

12. MAJOR GENERAL FAZLE HAQ WAS PROMOTED TO THREE STARS AND GIVEN THE PESHAWAR CORPS. HE HAS A LOWER PROFILE AND IS CONSIDERED LESS OF A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE

CMLA, THAN THE SENIOR COMMANDERS LIKE IQBAL OR ARBAB.
IN ANOTHER MOVE, LT. GENERAL RAHIMUDDIN ASSUMED COMMAND
OF THE MULTAN CORPS. RAHIMUDDIN IS ONE OF ZIA'S FRIENDS
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AND CONFIDANTS AND CAN BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT THE CMLA
IN MILITARY CIRCLE DELIBERATIONS.

13. TWO OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS DID NOT MOVE. LT
GENERAL GHULAM HUSSAIN REMAINED COMMANDER AT MANGLA. LT. GENERAL
CHISTHI RETAINS CONTROL OF THE CORPS IN RAWALPINDI AND MUST,
FOLLOWING THE SHUFFLE, NOW BE CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MOST
PROMINENT COMMANDERS. CHISTHI IS BRIGHT, INCREASINGLY
ASSERTIVE AND, WE BELIEVE, PLAYS ONE OF THE MORE INFLUENTIAL
ROLES IN THE MILITARY CADRE SURROUNDING THE CMLA. WE
HAVE REPORTS THAT CHISTHI, WHO ALSO HANDLES KASHMIR AFFAIRS,
OFTEN ACTS AS LIAISON BETWEEN ZIA AND SEVERAL OF THE
POLITICAL LEADERS, HE IS ALSO THE MOST LIKELY CHOICE IF
ZIA LOOKS FOR A MILITARY COLLEAGUE TO CARRY OUT SENSITIVE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL MISSIONS FOR THE MLA.

14. THE CORPS COMMANDER CHANGES CONTRIBUTED TO A SHIFT
IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ZIA AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES.
ON JULY FIFTH, ZIA WAS ONE OF THEM, THE LEADER OF THE
GROUP THAT REMOVED BHUTTO. BY DICTATING THE SHIFTS, AND
BY PUTTING PEOPLE HE CONSIDERS MORE TRUSTWORTHY AND LOYAL
IN SEVERAL OF THE CORPS, HE ASSERTED HIS PREEMINENCE AND
SIGNALLED THAT HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF ABOVE THE COMMANDERS,
RATHER THAN ONE OF THEM.

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15. HOWEVER, THE SHIFTS DID TAKE TIME, REQUIRED CONSIDER-
ABLE EFFORT ON ZIA'S PART, AND WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT PROMISES
THE CMLA MIGHT HAVE MADE TO ACHIEVE THE COMMANDERS'
ACQUIESCENCE. SOME SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS PROBABLY STILL
DIFFER WITH ZIA ON SOME ISSUES-WE BELIEVE THAT GENERALLY
THE CORPS COMMANDERS FAVOR A TOUGHTER MARTIAL LAW THAN
ZIA DOES-AND HE MUST LISTEN TO THEIR ADVICE AND VIEWS
WHICH NECESSARILY AFFECT HIS OWN DECISIONS. THERE ARE SOME
ISSUES OF DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNANCE ON WHICH ZIA EVIDENTLY HAS
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A FREE HAND. THERE ARE OTHER MORE BASIC MATTERS WHERE HE
MIST WORK CLOSELY WITH HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES.

16. WE HAVE SEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT ZIA'S FELLOW OFFICERS
ARE DISCONTENTED WITH THE CMLA'S ROLE. CRITICIZED BY SOME
AS TOO WEAK, BY OTHERS AS NOT SAVVY ENOUGH TO BE HEAD OF
GOVERNMENT, HE CANNOT COUNT ON UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FROM

THE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE MILITARY ON ALL ISSUES. HOWEVER,
FOR THE MOMENT HIS LEADERSHIP IS ACCEPTED. IF THE COMMANDERS
SHOULD STRENUOUSLY DISAGREE WITH ZIA, THEY HAVE TWO
PATHS OPEN TO THEM, EITHER RESIGN OR REMOVE ZIA. WE HAVE
NO INDICATION EITHER MOVE IS IMMINENT.

17. ZIA'S PERSONAL STAFF - MAJOR GENERAL KHALID MAHMUD
ARIF HAS BECOME THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF ZIA'S
INNER CIRCLE OF MILITARY STAFF OFFICERS. ARIF REMAINS
ZIA'S PRIMARY LIAISON WITH THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE MLA'S
CIVILIAN ADVISORS. ALTHOUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS LESSENED HIS WORK LOAD, HIS POSITION

AS MLA CHIEF OF STAFF GIVES HIM CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND IN THE FLOW OF PAPERS TO AND FROM THE CMLA.

18. ARIF'S POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED WITH THE DEPARTURE OF BRIGADIER KHARWAR LATIF BUTT, ZIA'S PERSONAL SECRETARY. KHARWAR, WHO IS IN LONDON ON A ONE YEAR TRAINING COURSE, HAS BEEN REPLACED BY LT. COLONEL ZAFAR ALI, A BRIGHT, AFFABLE AND TALENTED OFFICER WHO LACKS THE PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH ZIA THAT KHARWAR ENJOYED. AS ZIA'S IMMEDIATE STAFF CHANGES, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAJOR FAYYAZ, ZIA'S AIDE-DE-CAMP, GROWS. FAYYAZ HAS BEEN WITH ZIA FOR OVER FIVE YEARS, AND HAS BECOME THE OFFICER CLOSEST TO THE CMLA. CONFIDENTIAL

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ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS,

HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH AND PROXIMITY TO THE CMLA MAKE HIM AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE INNER CIRCLE AND AN INFLUENTIAL CONDUIT TO AND FROM THE CMLA.

19. CIVIL ADVISORS- ZIA'S QASI-CABINET, THE COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, HAS ASSUMED MANY OF THE DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGING THE COUNTRY. EVEN THOUGH THE ADVISORS ARE NOT ELECTED OFFICIALS-AS PPP POLITICIANS CONTINUALLY NOTE-MANY, IRONICALLY, HAVE GREATER AUTHORITY EXPERTISE, AND POWER THAN DID EQUIVALENT CABINET MINISTERS DURING THE BHUTTO YEARS.

20. SEVERAL OF THE ADVISORS, SUCH AS GOKHAL (SHIPPING), AMIR MOHAMMAD (AGRICULTURE), HABIBULLAH (INDUSTRIES) AND KURESHI (RAILWAYS), ARE ABLE "TECHNOCRATS" FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. THIS HAS GIVEN THEM MORE AUTHORITY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE MINISTRIES AND INCREASED THEIR ABILITY TO CONFRONT THEIR CIVIL SERVANTS ON MATTERS OF DETAIL.

21. ZIA AND THE MLA DO NOT SHARE THE PERVASIVE INTEREST BHUTTO HAD IN ALL COMPONENTS OF GOVERNMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF THE ADVISORS ARE GIVEN A MUCH FREER HAND THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS HAD DURING THE PPP YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, AGHA SHAHI HAS GREATER INDEPENDENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICY FORMULATION THAN DID HIS PREDECESSOR UNDER BHUTTO. THE ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS PATTERN IS DEFENSE WHERE ZIA AND HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES HAVE AN OBVIOUS DIRECT INTEREST. ZIA HAS INSTALLED MAJ. GENERAL JILANI, HIS FORMER CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND A TRUSTED COLLEAGUE AS DEFENSE SECRETARY. AND HAS RETAINED THE DEFENSE PORTFOLIO FOR HIMSELF.

22. SECRETARY-GENERAL-IN-CHIEF GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN REMAINS
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SUPREME AMONG THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND IS STILL THE DE FACTO PRIME MINISTER, AT LEAST AS MANAGER OF THE DETAILS OF GOVERNMENT. ISHAQ CONTINUES TO XHIBIT THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS WHICH MARKED HIM AS A MASTER BUREAUCRAT FOR MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS IN PUBLIC SERVICE ON THE SUBCONTINENT-INTELLIGENT, KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, ELITIST, MANIPULATIVE, IMPATIENT, AND AUTHORITARIAN. HE ENJOY'S ZIA'S COMPLETE CONFIDENCE, AND MANY OF THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT REFLECT HIS OWN MARKET-ORIENTED AND ANTI-SOCIALIST BENT. ONE OF ISHAQ'S PRIMARY WEAKNESSES HAS PLAGUED THE MLA, HOWEVER; HAUGHTY, SELF-ASSURED, AND CONFIDENT, ISHAQ HAS TOLD FRIENDS THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IN STAFF STUDIES AND TREATS HIS ECONOMIC ADVISORS WITH A CERTAIN DISDAIN. CONFIDENT THAT HIS YEARS OF SERVICE HAVE GIVEN HIM INSIGHTS AND EXPERIENCE OTHERS LACK, HE IS OFTEN UNWILLING TO LISTEN TO ADVICE. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SEVERAL OF THE MLA'S ECONOMIC DECISIONS WERE MADE BY ISHAQ WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF EITHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR FINANCE OR SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

23. CIVIL SERVICE-THE DISTRUST OF AND ANIMOSITY TOWARD GENERAL ZIA FELT BY THE CIVIL SERVICE CADRE AFTER THE TAKE-OVER-BECAUSE OF ZIA'S OFT-REPEATED SHARP CRITICISMS OF CIVIL SERVANTS-HAVE BEEN TEMPERED AS THE CIVIL SERVICE HAS HELD ITS OWN. IT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, COMPLETELY THROWN IN ITS LOT WITH THE MLA. BUREAUCRATS, STILL DOUBTGUL ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, REMAIN INSECURE AND CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN POSSIBLE, KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE FUTURE.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

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24. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CIVIL SERVANTS REALIZE THAT ZIA AND THE MLA ARE MORE DEPENDENT ON THE BUREAUCRACY AND LESS ABLE TO MANIPULATE IT THAN WAS ZIA'S PREDECESSOR AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. THE CIVIL SERVICE IS LESS WORRIED THAN IT WAS UNDER BHUTTO ABOUT THE "POLITICIZATION" OF THE SERVICE. THEY CAN POINT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, WITH A MANDATE TO "IMPROVE THE PROFESSIONALISM" CONFIDENTIAL

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OF THE SERVICE, AS A WELCOME DEPARTURE FROM WHAT THEY SAW AS BHUTTO'S ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THEIR ELITE CADRE.

25. THE INCREASED AUTHORITY OF THE ADVISORS AND THE CAREET CIVIL SERVANTS HAS MADE IT EASIER FOR THE BUREAUCRACY TO IMPEDE WHAT THEY SEE AS INADVISABLE ACTIONS ORDERED BY THE CMLA. A STRIKING EXAMPLE WAS GENERAL ZIA'S PROMISE TO THE AMBASSADOR TO RAID HEROIN LABS IN THE TRIBAL AREAS. BOTH THE SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR IN THE FRONTIER DISAGREED WITH ZIA, AND CONSEQUENTLY NO ACTION AGAINST THE LABS HAS YET BEEN TAKEN. ALTHOUGH ZIA IS IN CHARGE AT THE TOP HE SEEMS TO LACK THE POWER TO ENFORCE FOLLOW-THROUGH ACTIONS, AND HE CAN OFTEN BE THWARTED WHEN THE BUREAUCRATS OR MILITARY OFFICERS DISAGREE WITH HIS DECISION.

26. POLITICIANS-ZIA STILL LACKS IMMEDIATE ADVISORS

WHO ARE POLITICALLY ASTUTE, AND HIS PERFORMANCE REFLECTS THIS. A.K. BROHI, THE ADVISOR ON LAW, PARLIAMENTARY, AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND THE CLOSEST ZIA HAS TO AN IN-HOUSE "INTELLECTUAL", APPEARS TO GIVE THE CMLA ADVISE ON POLITICAL MATTERS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH BROHI IS A FORMER FEDERAL MINISTER, HE HAS NEVER HELD ELECTIVE OFFICE AND IS KNOWN MORE FOR HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THAN HIS POLITICAL ACUMEN.

27. AS HE HAS SEARCHED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO A BHUTTO LED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, ZIA HAS HAD GREATER CONTACT WITH POLITICIANS THAN HE DID IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE TAKE-OVER. SOME OBSERVERS CONTEND HE HAS COVERTLY BACKED SEVERAL POLITICOS, SUCH AS ASGHAR KHAN, KAUSAR NIAZI, AND WALI KHAN, AND LATER ABANDONED THEM WHEN THEY COULD NOT ACQUIRE PUBLIC SUPPORT. IF SO, HIS ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PAKISTAN IS NO NEARER NOW TO A NATIONALLY POPULAR LEADER TO REPLACE BHUTTO THAN IT WAS LAST JULY FIFTH (REF C).

28. ZIA'S INCREASED EXPOSURE TO PAKISTAN'S POLITICIANS HAS INCREASED HIS DISDAIN FOR THEM. HE IS CONVINCED THEY ARE GENERALLY INCOMPETENT AND UNFIT, AND HE HOPES THAT NEW LEADERS WILL "ARISE FROM THE PEOPLE" TO REPLACE THE PRESENT INEFFECTUAL GROUP. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF ZIA'S CRITICISM MAY BE CORRECT, THE POLITICIANS, IF HE WERE WILL TO CONSULT THEM, COULD NEVERTHELESS OFFER SOME USEFUL ADVISE ON HOW TO HANDLE THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

29. PAKISTAN'S DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM HAS EVOLVED SLOWLY OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS TO ONE MORE IN TUNE WITH A GOVERNMENT LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A LONGER STAY IN POWER. SOME OF THE NAIVITY, IMPETUOSITY, AND AMATEURISM OF ZIA'S EARLY DAYS IN POWER HAS DIMINISHED. THE ARMY REMAINS THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUP, WHILE THE BUREAUCRATS REASSERT THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH A WORKABLE SYSTEM TO MANAGE PAKISTAN HAS BEEN DEvised, AND MEETS THE COUNTRY'S BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE NEEDS, IT IS A SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT EXPEDITE THE SEARCH FOR APOLITICAL REMEDY FOR THE NATION'S ILLS.

30. THE SYSTEM MAY, IN FACT, EVOLVE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE MILITARY WILL HAVE A MORE ACTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ROLE THAN IT DID FORMERLY. MOVEMENT TOWARD THE "TURKISH MODEL", WHERE THE ARMY HAS GREATER AUTHORITY TO MEDIATE MAJOR POLITICAL DISPUTES THAN IT DOES IN PAKISTAN, OR SOME TYPE OF PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES. WE KNOW THAT SOME SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE CONSIDERED STEPS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE ARMY TO AVOID THE CYCLE OF WITHDRAWAL, ASSERTION AND COUP WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED ITS

ROLE FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, AND GENERAL ZIA HAS
MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.
WHETHER EVENTS, POLITICIANS, HSI MILITARY COLLEAGUES, OR
THE PUBLIC TEMPER WILL ALLOW ZIA THE TIME AND AUTHORITY
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TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH CHANGES, HOWEVER, IS NOT KNOWN.
HUMMEL

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